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I. INTRODUCTION
The digital world is a popular place these days. In its fourth quarter
of 2012, Facebook reported 618 million daily users.2 In fiscal year 2012,
Google reported 235 million active users across its properties (e.g.,
1. James D. Lamm is a Principal at Gray Plant Mooty in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Christina
L. Kunz is a Professor Emerita at William Mitchell College of Law in Saint Paul, Minnesota.
Damien A. Riehl is an Associate at Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi in Minneapolis, Minnesota.
Peter John Rademacher is a law student at William Mitchell College of Law in Saint Paul,
Minnesota, and will receive his Juris Doctor in May 2014.
2. Investor Relations: Facebook Reports Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2012 Results,
FACEBOOK (Jan. 30, 2013), http://investor.fb.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=736911.
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Gmail and YouTube)3; Activision Blizzard estimated over 9.6 million
subscribers to World of Warcraft4; and the list goes on.5 The United
States’s Internet use ranks among the highest—both in number and per-
centage of population.6 Members, users, and subscribers (“account hold-
ers”) accumulate digital property by uploading photographs, videos, and
other data, investing time into profile development, adding written mate-
rial, and building their own subscribership accounts.
How should this property be managed during the account holders’
lives? Upon the account holders’ deaths, what should happen to it? How
should it be maintained? How should it be distributed? As one author
notes, “[M]ore and more of what happens in the [physical] world is also
seeping into the [digital] world . . . .”7 That includes our need for fiduci-
aries in many aspects of life and death. Every single Internet user will
die, many will suffer some form of incapacity, and some will have valu-
able or significant digital property that needs to be protected and man-
aged.8 In the physical world, legal mechanisms can address these
issues.9
3. Google Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), 3 (Jan. 29, 2013), available at http://www.sec
.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312513028362/d452134d10k.htm.
4. Press Release, Activision Blizzard, Activision Blizzard Announces Better-Than-Expected
Fourth Quarter & Calendar Year 2012 Results (Feb. 7, 2013) (on file with author), available at
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ACTI/2329417148x0x634081/fbb6a75d-f965-442b-8d6a-
bde335918118/Q4_2012_atvi_press_release.pdf.
5. Yahoo! Mail is reported to have over 281 million unique visitors. Rani Molla, Gmail
Finally Beats Hotmail, According to Third-Party Data [Chart], GIGAOM (Oct. 31, 2012, 10:38
AM), http://gigaom.com/2012/10/31/gmail-finally-beats-hotmail-according-to-third-party-data-
chart/ (place cursor on blue graph bar representing Yahoo! Mail worldwide e-mail ranking).
Twitter is reported at over 170 million active users. Ingrid Lunden, Twitter May Have 500M+
Users but Only 170M Are Active, 75% on Twitter’s Own Clients, TECHCRUNCH (July 31, 2012),
http://techcrunch.com/2012/07/31/twitter-may-have-500m-users-but-only-170m-are-active-75-on-
twitters-own-clients/. PayPal is reported at over 117 million users. Ryan Kim, PayPal Launches
Pre-Paid Cards to Help Cash Lovers Buy Online, GIGAOM (Dec. 13, 2012, 8:49 AM), http://
gigaom.com/2012/12/13/paypal-launches-pre-paid-cards-to-help-cash-lovers-buy-online/.
Soundcloud operates with roughly 200 million monthly users, Tumblr with 216 million monthly
visitors, and Wordpress hosts over 66 million blogs. Craig Smith, How Many People Use the Top
Social Media, Apps & Services? (September 2013), DIGITAL MARKETING RAMBLINGS (Sept. 2,
2013), http://expandedramblings.com/index.php/resource-how-many-people-use-the-top-social-
media/3/.
6. Top 20 Internet Countries by Users—2012 Q2, INTERNET WORLD STATS, http://www
.internetworldstats.com/top20.htm (last updated Mar. 6, 2013).
7. Mathew Ingram, Facebook and Death: Blurring the Line Between the Real and Virtual,
GIGAOM (Nov. 13, 2012, 2:09 PM), http://gigaom.com/2012/11/13/facebook-and-death-blurring-
the-line-between-the-real-and-virtual/.
8. In 2008, the European Network and Information Security Agency estimated that “the real
money value of virtual world objects being traded each year [was] $2 billion.” Simon Hill, Most
Expensive Items Ever Sold in an MMO, ALTERED GAMER, http://world-of-warcraft.alteredgamer
.com/wow-other-items/29070-most-expensive-items-ever-sold-in-an-mmo/ (last updated Apr. 18,
2012).
9. See generally, e.g., UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP AND PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS ACT (1998);
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Other bodies of law do not impede these mechanisms, which have
evolved over hundreds of years, but the digital world is like the “Wild
West,” in that its growth has outpaced legal and regulatory efforts.10
Although federal and state governments have enacted laws to control
aspects of the digital world, some of these laws predate the World Wide
Web11 and stand as inadvertent barriers to the execution of fiduciary
duties in the digital world. State legislatures, private entities, and courts
have made some efforts to correct these problems, but no current solu-
tions provide the level of certainty that account holders and courts typi-
cally seek in fiduciary property management. Consequently, account
holders are uncertain about the future of their digital property; fiducia-
ries must choose between refusing to manage digital property at the risk
of civil liability, and executing their duties at the risk of criminal liabil-
ity. Additionally, digital service providers (“service providers”) must
fend for themselves by carefully crafting their terms of service (“TOS”)
and privacy policies (“PPs”).
This article discusses four types of fiduciaries, each of which is
affected by the vast growth in and the need to manage digital property.
The article begins by defining digital property and discussing why it
must be managed.12 The article then discusses how digital property
affects powers of attorney, conservatorships, probate administration, and
trusts.13
After illustrating the problems that digital property creates for each
fiduciary, the article shifts to resolving these problems. It begins by
debunking purported solutions by both private and governmental enti-
ties.14 It concludes by offering a holistic approach to resolving the con-
flicts facing account holders, fiduciaries, and service providers and
providing the level of security sought in fiduciary property management,
as well as a best-practices approach in the interim to a complete
UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT (2006); UNIF. PROBATE CODE (amended 2010); UNIF. TRUST
CODE (amended 2010).
10. E.g., Michael B. Sapherstein, Intelligent Agents and Copyright: Internet Technology
Outpaces the Law . . . Again, B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. (Oct. 28, 1997), http://bciptf.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/07/56-INTELLIGENT-AGENTS-AND-COPYRIGHT.pdf (generally noting
legislation’s inherent inability to catch up with technology’s fast pace).
11. In 1986, Congress enacted the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-474, 100
Stat. 1213 (codified at 18 U.S.C § 1030 (2012)); Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522, 2701-2712 (2012)). The
World Wide Web was introduced in 1990. Tim Berners-Lee, Pre-W3C Web and Internet
Background, W3C, http://www.w3.org/2004/Talks/w3c10-HowItAllStarted/?n=15 (last visited
Sept. 7, 2013).
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part III.
14. See infra Part IV.
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II. DIGITAL PROPERTY: INTANGIBLE, BUT IMPORTANT
The term “property” has many definitions. When used in the con-
text of fiduciary management, property generally “includes both real and
personal property or any interest therein and means anything that may be
the subject of ownership.”16 But what is digital property, and why
should anyone care? This section sheds light on the nature of digital
property, what it includes, and why it is important.
A. What Is Digital Property?
Personal property can be tangible or intangible. Whereas tangible
personal property takes corporeal form,17 intangible personal property
lacks physical existence.18 Intangible personal property includes finan-
cial accounts, stocks, options, intellectual property rights, and so-called
digital property.19 One type of digital property is electronically stored
information, which may be stored locally or “in the cloud.” While digital
property can take the form of Web sites, such as “e-mail, social network-
ing sites (Facebook, LinkedIn, Google+, MySpace, etc.), eBay, PayPal,
Web pages, blogs, photo sharing accounts like Flickr, video sharing
accounts like YouTube, music accounts like iTunes and Pandora, online
video games like World of Warcraft, [and] online storage accounts,”20
most service providers deliver these Web site accounts as a service with-
out vesting any property rights in the subscribers.21 The TOS may pre-
vent an account holder from transferring the account itself or allowing
others to access the account.22
More commonly, individuals’ digital property is the content they
upload onto these Web sites. For instance, when account holders post
15. See infra Part V.
16. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-201(38) (amended 2010); see UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT
§ 102(10) (2006) (providing an equivalent definition).
17. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1337–38 (9th ed. 2009).
18. Id. at 1336.
19. See, e.g., Jason Mazzone, Facebook’s Afterlife, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1643, 1648 (2012); Rex
M. Anderson, Digital Assets in Estates, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Mar. 2013, at 44, 44.
20. James D. Lamm, Digital Death: Estate Planning for Passwords, Online Accounts, and
Digital Property 2 (Jan. 20, 2012), available at http://www.actec.org/Documents/misc/James_
Lamm_-_Digital_Death_01_20_2012.pdf.
21. See, e.g., World of Warcraft Terms of Use, BLIZZARD ENTERTAINMENT, http://us.blizzard
.com/en-us/company/legal/wow_tou.html (last updated Aug. 22, 2012) (granting the user “a
Limited License to Use the Service”).
22. For a clear discussion of the difference between accounts and content in accounts, see Jim
Lamm, What Happens to Your Apple iTunes Music, Videos, and eBooks When You Die?, DIGITAL
PASSING (Sept. 4, 2012), http://www.digitalpassing.com/2012/09/04/apple-itunes-music-videos-
ebooks-die/.
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songs, photos, videos, and other data, these items qualify as digital prop-
erty.23 Digital property rights may also exist for subscribers to online
games, such as Farmville, Second Life, and World of Warcraft, where
subscribers have paid for and may have even created or acquired online
gaming avatars and other assets in online games.24 Moreover, digital
property can include intellectual property, such as copyrights, trade-
marks, trade secrets, rights of privacy, rights of publicity, and the like.25
Take copyright, for instance. “Copyright protection subsists, in accor-
dance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression . . . .”26 “A work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium
of expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or
under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to
permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a
period of more than transitory duration.”27 Copyrights often vest in
account holders—regardless of where their content is posted or stored,
and regardless of whether the medium is digital or analog—because they
are the authors.28
This article focuses on an account holder’s digital property rights or
intellectual property rights in the account contents that are stored by a
service provider and accessed through a service provider’s Web site or
other communications protocol. This article does not cover a service
provider’s service contracts to use its hardware, software, Web site, or
other services.
B. Why Digital Property Should Not Be Overlooked
The United States Department of Commerce reported from census
data that from 2000 to 2010, the percentage of Internet-connected house-
holds jumped from 41.5% to 71.1%.29 From domain names to blogs,
avatars to social media, this rising tide of Internet use translates into
more digital property that can have both financial and sentimental value.
1. FINANCIAL VALUE
A 2011 survey found that U.S. consumers valued their digital
23. See id.
24. See infra Part II.B.1.
25. See generally Pamela Samuelson, Digital Media and the Changing Face of Intellectual
Property Law, 16 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 323 (1990) (discussing the legal challenges
posed by developing digital media).
26. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
27. Id. § 101.
28. See id. § 201(a).
29. NAT’L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, DIGITAL NATION:
EXPANDING INTERNET USAGE 7 fig.1 (2011), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/
publications/ntia_internet_use_report_february_2011.pdf.
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assets, stored across multiple digital devices, at an average of $55,000
per person.30 That value can emanate from intellectual property rights,
advertising revenue from Web sites and blogs, avatar development, vir-
tual property in virtual worlds, and domain names.31 While much digital
property has little or no financial value, some items have considerable
value. Many, but not all, examples of valuable digital property come
from the gaming and virtual-world communities. For instance, in a sin-
gle transaction in 2005, Jon Jacobs mortgaged his home to purchase a
virtual resort for $100,000 in real money32; in 2011, that same resort’s
estimated value was $1 million.33 In 2011, a man paid $16,000 for a
digital sword to be used in a game that would not be released until the
spring of 2012.34 In 2012, Blizzard opened an auction house, where
players could exchange real money for digital gear.35 In the same year,
an investor purchased land deeds in Planet Calypso for $2.5 million.36
Today, World of Warcraft players pay approximately $15 for 1,000
“gold”—currency for the game.37 Outside of the gaming and virtual-
world realms, the digital world even houses a decentralized digital cur-
rency called Bitcoin, which is created through the process of “mining”
and can be exchanged for nationally recognized currencies.38 In July
2013, one Bitcoin equated to $76.75.39
2. SENTIMENTAL VALUE
Some digitally stored photographs, poems, messages, videos, e-
mails, and the like may have sentimental (rather than financial) value to
30. McAfee Reveals Average Internet User Has More Than $37,000 in Underprotected
“Digital Assets”, MCAFEE (Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.mcafee.com/us/about/news/2011/q3/
20110927-01.aspx.
31. Lamm, supra note 20, at 2.
32. E.g., Oliver Chiang, Meet the Man Who Just Made a Half Million from the Sale of Virtual
Property, FORBES (Nov. 13, 2010, 7:20 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/oliverchiang/2010/11/
13/meet-the-man-who-just-made-a-cool-half-million-from-the-sale-of-virtual-property/.
33. Hill, supra note 8.
34. Jim Sterling, Man Buys Virtual Sword for Unreleased Game, Pays $16,000,
DESTRUCTOID, (Dec. 29, 2011, 1:00 PM), http://www.destructoid.com/man-buys-virtual-sword-
for-unreleased-game-pays-16-000-218682.phtml.
35. Paul Tassi, Why Diablo 3’s Real Money Auction House Should Not Be Your Summer Job,
FORBES (June 13, 2012, 10:04 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/insertcoin/2012/06/13/why-
diablo-3s-real-money-auction-house-should-not-be-your-summer-job-2/.
36. Press Release, MindArk, Entropia Universe Receives $2.5 Million Dollars from One
Investor in Planet Calypso Citizenship System (Apr. 4, 2012), available at http://www.prnewswire
.com/news-releases/entropia-universe-receives-25-million-dollars-from-one-investor-in-planet-cal
ypso-citizenship-system-146075785.html.
37. Hill, supra note 8.
38. See Leah Yamshon, Portrait of a Bitcoin Miner: How One Man Made $192K in Virtual
Currency, IT WORLD (July 10, 2013, 1:11 PM), http://www.itworld.com/internet/364484/portrait-
bitcoin-miner-how-one-man-made-192k-virtual-currency.
39. Id.
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members, users, or subscribers—as well as their families and friends.40
As one commentator noted, “[P]ostings . . . might be of value given
what could be done with digital data in the future. . . . On the horizon
may be interactive holograms that look and sound like a deceased indi-
vidual, based upon that individual’s digital archive . . . .”41 Even if inter-
active holograms never come to fruition, more and more memorabilia is
stored digitally, replacing an outmoded system of physical storage.42
Therefore, there is still good reason to protect and manage certain digital
property, even if it has no financial value.
III. FOUR FIDUCIARIES AND A LOT OF PROBLEMS
A fiduciary ensures that property is well managed, during the life or
after the death of the property owner. In the physical world, the fiduci-
ary’s roles are widely accommodated by other bodies of law (such as
contract law, banking and payments law, privacy law, criminal law, and
the like). But the same cannot be said for the digital world, which has
developed without close attention to fiduciaries’ roles.43 This section
briefly describes power of attorney, conservatorship, probate administra-
tion, and trusts44—as well as why digital property poses problems for
each.45
A. Four Bodies of Fiduciary Law Facing Similar Concerns
1. BASIC STRUCTURE OF STATUTORY POWER OF ATTORNEY
Under the Uniform Power of Attorney Act of 2006, an agent is “a
person granted authority to act for a principal . . . .”46 The principal47
generally grants that authority by executing and signing (or consciously
witnessing the signature of) a power of attorney.48 An agent, once
granted authority, may accept appointment by exercising authority as an
40. See Lamm, supra note 20, at 4–5.
41. Mazzone, supra note 19, at 1650–51.
42. See Lamm, supra note 20, at 5.
43. Cf. Stephen J. Lusch, State Taxation of Cloud Computing, 29 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 369, 371 (2013) (“As the digital environment in which we live continues to
change at speeds that were unfathomable two decades ago, archaic state tax systems have
struggled to keep pace.”).
44. See infra Part III.A. To avoid unnecessary discussion of jurisdictional splits, this article
relies solely on the Uniform Power of Attorney Act, the Uniform Guardianship and Protective
Proceedings Act, the Uniform Probate Code, and the Uniform Trust Code to explain their
respective bodies of law.
45. See infra Parts III.B–C.
46. UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 102(1) (2006). The Uniform Power of Attorney Act
replaced the term “attorney in fact” with “agent,” as a means of alleviating confusion among
laypeople between an “attorney in fact” and an “attorney at law.” Id. § 102 cmt.
47. Id. § 102(9).
48. Id. § 105.
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agent, by performing duties as an agent, or by indicating acceptance
through assertions or conduct.49
When a power of attorney becomes effective, the agent receives the
general authority referenced in the power of attorney,50 incidental
authority that accompanies all general authority granted,51 and additional
authority expressly granted through special instructions in the power of
attorney.52 These authorities include the power to manage the specified
subject matters, including property,53 and the cumulative effect of these
authorities can be narrow or substantial.
Although an agent generally has no initial duty to act, if he or she
does take action, he or she must adhere to certain duties,
“[n]otwithstanding provisions in the power of attorney.”54 Those duties
include acting in accordance with the principal’s reasonable expecta-
tions, or, if unknown, in the principal’s best interest and acting in good
faith.55 In addition to these mandatory standards, unless otherwise pro-
vided in a power of attorney, an agent must act to avoid conflicts of
interest that would impair his or her ability to act impartially for the
principal’s best interests and must seek to maintain the principal’s estate
plan, taking into consideration the nature and value of property and the
likelihood of obligations and need for maintenance.56 Finally, if an agent
is selected for his or her special skills, he or she must apply those skills
in the execution of his or her duties.57
If the agent violates the power of attorney or its accompanying
duties, a court may grant damages to restore the value of the principal’s
property and reimburse the principal for attorney’s fees paid on behalf of
the agent.58 However, courts are not restricted from awarding other
forms of relief provided for by other laws of the governing jurisdic-
tion.59 To ensure the likely enforcement of an agent’s duties, there are
“broad categories of persons who have standing to petition the court
for . . . review of the agent’s conduct,”60 including a “person that dem-
49. Id. § 113.
50. Id. § 202 (providing general authority for subject matter listed in Sections 204 through
217 that is referenced in an executed power of attorney).
51. Id. § 203 cmt.
52. Id. § 201, 201 cmt.
53. See, e.g., id. §§ 203, 205, 208–09.
54. Id. § 114(a); see also id. § 113 cmt.
55. Id. § 114(a)(1)–(2).
56. Id. § 114(b)(2), (6).
57. See id. § 114(e) (providing that courts must consider an agent’s special skills when
evaluating the agent’s care, competence, and diligence).
58. Id. § 117.
59. Id. § 123, 123 cmt.
60. Id. § 116 cmt.
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onstrates sufficient interest in the principal’s welfare.”61
2. BASIC STRUCTURE OF CONSERVATORSHIP
Under the Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act of
1998, a conservator is “a person who is appointed by a court to manage
the estate of a protected person.”62 A court can appoint a conservator
upon the petition of:
(1) the person to be protected; (2) an individual interested in the
estate, affairs, or welfare of the person to be protected . . . ; or (3) a
person who would be adversely affected by lack of effective manage-
ment of the property . . . of the person to be protected.63
After ascertaining that the person to be protected lacks the ability to
manage his or her own property or business affairs or has property that
will otherwise be wasted,64 a court may appoint a conservator.65 Once
appointed, a conservator can accept the office by filing an acceptance of
appointment and submitting any required bond, after which the court
will issue letters of conservatorship.66
When a conservatorship becomes effective, a conservator typically
has all available authority unless expressly limited in the court order and
on the letters of conservatorship.67 The conservator has authority over
most aspects of property management,68 distribution and expenditures
for the care of the protected person and his or her dependents,69 and
management of the protected person’s estate plan subject to court
approval.70 Essentially, a conservator obtains complete managerial
authority over the protected person’s property at least to the extent that
the protected person is unable to manage his or her property.
A conservator’s acts are constrained by certain duties. A conserva-
tor must “observe the standards of care applicable to a trustee”;71 refrain
from any exercise of authority that is unnecessary;72 develop a plan that
is “based on the actual needs of the person [to be protected] and take
into consideration the best interest of [that] person”;73 and take into
61. Id. § 116(a)(8).
62. UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP & PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS ACT § 102(2) (1998).
63. Id. § 403(a).
64. See id. § 401(2).
65. Id. § 409(a)–(b).
66. Id. § 110.
67. Id. § 425(a).
68. Id. § 425(b).
69. Id. § 427(a).
70. Id. § 411(a).
71. Id. § 418(a).
72. Id. § 418(b).
73. Id. § 418(c).
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account any known estate plan of the protected person when making
decisions regarding investment, distribution, and powers of revocation.74
“[A] court may require a conservator to furnish a bond conditioned
upon faithful discharge of all duties of the conservatorship according to
law, with sureties as it may specify.”75 The court can then supervise the
conservator’s execution of the conservatorship.76 Any interested person
may bring a proceeding against the surety for the conservator’s breach
of the obligation secured by the bond.77 The court may hear proceedings
against the bond until the bond is exhausted.78 In addition to the conser-
vator’s liability under the bond, the protected person, or a person inter-
ested in the protected person’s welfare, may petition the court to
terminate the conservator’s appointment under the standard of “the best
interest of the . . . protected person.”79
3. BASIC STRUCTURE OF PROBATE ADMINISTRATION
Under the Uniform Probate Code of 2010, a personal representative
can be an executor (named in a valid will) or an administrator (appointed
in the absence of a valid will).80 For the personal representative to be
appointed, he or she must petition the court or Registrar81 (this article
will refer only to the court), at which time the court may make such an
appointment.82 A personal representative may then choose to accept
office by filing “any required bond and a statement of acceptance of the
duties of the office.”83 After the filing, the court will issue letters for the
estate’s administration.84
The personal representative has power over the decedent’s estate
equivalent to what “an absolute owner would have.”85 Except as
restricted by a will or an order in a formal proceeding, a personal repre-
sentative must act “for the benefit of the interested persons” and has a
range of powers, including the following: (1) retaining assets; (2) receiv-
ing assets; (3) depositing or investing liquid assets of the estate;
(4) acquiring or disposing of assets; and (5) abandoning property that is
74. Id. § 418(d).
75. Id. § 415.
76. See, e.g., id. § 419(a) (requiring the conservator to prepare an inventory of the estate);
id. § 420(a) (requiring the conservator to report to the court annually, unless otherwise directed).
77. Id. § 416(a)(3).
78. Id. § 416(a)(4).
79. Id. § 112(b).
80. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-201(35) (amended 2010).
81. Id. § 3-402(a)–(b) (formal testacy); id. § 3-301(a) (informal probate).
82. Id. § 3-103.
83. Id. § 3-601.
84. See id. § 3-103.
85. Id. § 3-711.
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valueless.86 However, unlike a conservator, a personal representative’s
power is not accompanied by vesting of title.87 The delegation of power
without title serves to “ease[ ] the succession of assets which are not
possessed by the personal representative.”88
A personal representative must pursue a very specific end: to settle
and distribute the decedent’s estate.89 This task must be performed in
compliance with the will, any court orders, and the statutory obligations
to “observe the standards of care applicable to trustees” and execute
tasks “as expeditiously and efficiently as is consistent with the best
interests of the estate,” as well as those of any successors.90
Because of the high stakes in the context of probate administration,
the court remains involved and has power to ensure that the estate’s
administration is carried out properly. Under informal proceedings, the
court may require a bond “upon appointment of a special administrator”
or when a will expressly requires a bond.91 In formal proceedings, the
court may require a bond unless a will expressly relieves the personal
representative of the bond requirement.92 Additionally, an interested
party may always demand a bond, so long as the party’s interest is suffi-
cient and the court finds the bond desirable.93 During administration of
the estate, any interested person may petition the court to bring proceed-
ings against the bond for the personal representative’s failure to meet his
or her fiduciary obligations.94 The bond may be proceeded against until
exhausted.95
In addition to an action against the personal representative’s bond,
an interested person may petition the court to temporarily restrain the
personal representative from specified actions that “would jeopardize
unreasonably the interest of the applicant or of some other interested
person.”96 Finally, any interested person may petition the court to per-
manently remove a personal representative for cause,97 which the court
will find in any of the following instances: (1) removal would be in the
best interest of the estate; or (2) “the personal representative has disre-
garded an order of the court, . . . mismanaged the estate, or failed to
86. Id. § 3-715 (1)–(2), (5)–(6), (11).
87. Id. § 3-711 cmt.
88. Id.
89. Id. § 3-703(a).
90. Id.
91. Id. § 3-603.
92. Id.
93. Id. § 3-605. The 2010 Uniform Probate Code sets the threshold interest at $5,000. Id.
94. Id. § 3-606(a)(4).
95. Id. § 3-605(a)(5).
96. Id. § 3-607(a).
97. Id. § 3-611(a).
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perform any duty pertaining to the office.”98
4. BASIC STRUCTURE OF TRUSTS
Under the Uniform Trust Code of 2010, a trustee can be “[a]ny
natural person . . . [that] has capacity to hold title to property free of
trust.”99 When appointed, a trustee has the authority to act for the set-
tlor.100 The settlor grants that authority by creating a trust and transfer-
ring property to the trustee either in the present or the future through
some trigger.101 Once granted authority, a trustee may accept the trustee-
ship “by [either] substantially complying with a method of acceptance
provided in the terms of the trust; or . . . if the terms of the trust do not
provide a method or the method provided in the terms is not expressly
made exclusive,” by other means of indicating acceptance.102 The trus-
tee must then submit any required bond.103
When a trust becomes effective, the trustee obtains certain powers
over the trust and trust property. These powers include the powers con-
ferred by the trust instrument;104 the power of an unmarried, competent,
individual owner, except as limited by the trust;105 the powers appropri-
ate to properly manage and distribute trust property;106 the power to
collect trust property;107 and the power to manage the trust property
through various transactions with beneficiaries or third parties.108 In
addition, the trustee has the power to delegate his or her power to other
agents.109
In the exercise of his or her powers, the trustee has specific obliga-
tions to the trust beneficiaries under the trust instrument, under state law,
and under common law. Among the trustee duties in the Uniform Trust
Code are the following: the duty to “administer the trust in good faith, in
accordance with its terms and purposes and the interests of the benefi-
ciaries”;110 the duty to “administer the trust solely in the interests of the
beneficiaries”;111 and the duty to “take reasonable steps to take control
98. Id. § 3-611(b).
99. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 103 cmt. (amended 2010).
100. See, e.g., id. §§ 815–16.
101. Id. § 401.
102. Id. § 701(a).
103. Id. § 702.
104. Id. § 815(a)(1).
105. Id. § 815(a)(2)(A).
106. Id. § 815(a)(2)(B).
107. Id. § 816(1).
108. E.g., id. § 816(2)–(3), (10)–(12), (19), (21)–(22), (26).
109. Id. § 807(a).
110. Id. § 801; see also id. § 105(b)(2).
111. Id. § 802(a).
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MIA\68-2\MIA206.txt unknown Seq: 13 14-FEB-14 9:13
2014] THE DIGITAL DEATH CONUNDRUM 397
of and protect the trust property.”112 In addition, if the trustee has special
skills or expertise, the trustee has a duty to use those special skills or
expertise.113
Should the trustee fail to adequately meet his or her duties, there
are remedies available to the persons interested in the trust. The trustee
could be removed for committing a serious breach of trust or for a per-
sistent failure to administer the trust effectively.114 A court also could
“compel the trustee to perform the trustee’s duties”;115 reduce a trustee’s
compensation;116 or “appoint a special fiduciary to take possession of
the trust property and administer the trust.”117
B. Presenting the Problems
These four bodies of fiduciary law play an integral role in protect-
ing and managing property regardless of its form. Despite this, digital
property poses unique problems to the planning and execution stages of
these fiduciary frameworks, particularly in the context of the Internet.
This section discusses the complications that account holders, fiducia-
ries, and digital service providers face when dealing with fiduciary man-
agement of digital property. The table on the following page summarizes
the problems posed to each body of fiduciary law:
112. Id. § 809.
113. Id. § 806.
114. Id. § 706(a)–(b).
115. Id. § 1001(b)(1).
116. Id. § 1001(b)(8).
117. Id. § 1001(b)(5).
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Bodies of Fiduciary Law
Power of Probate
Attorney Conservatorship Administration Trust
Account Sharing account access information with fiduciaries may violate some TOSs.
Holders’
Issues
Some service providers terminate
accounts and account contents at
death.
TOSs may
prohibit transfer
of title for
accounts to the
trustee.
Fiduciaries’ With respect to the SCA, specific “lawful consent” for disclosure of account
Issues contents should come from the account holder.
A general grant A general grant of broad fiduciary
of broad authority under the governing
fiduciary instrument may not be sufficient.
authority under
the governing
instrument may
not be sufficient.
General or specific authority under state fiduciary statutes may not be
sufficient.
The fiduciary may not be able to give “lawful consent” on behalf of the
account holder.
Accessing accounts may violate the TOS and computer crime laws on
unauthorized access, creating the potential for criminal prosecution.
The fiduciary cannot compel service providers to disclose account content.
TOSs may
prohibit transfer
of title for
accounts to
fiduciaries.
Service Lawful consent may need to come from the account holder—fiduciary’s
Providers’ consent may not be enough.
Issues
Voluntary disclosure of account contents may place service providers at risk
of civil liability under the SCA.
Voluntary disclosure of account contents may constitute an unfair and
deceptive trade practice, leading to charges by the federal FTC and state
mini-FTCs.
Providers may
be unaware of
account holder’s
attempt to
transfer title to
the account to
his or her
trustee.
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1. RESTRICTIONS ON ACCOUNT HOLDERS
In order to manage an account holder’s digital property, a fiduciary
must be able to access it. To facilitate access, the account holder may
choose to disclose access information—such as usernames, account
numbers, and passwords—or store that information where the fiduciary
can access it. For some online accounts, this disclosure results in a viola-
tion of the TOS.118 For example, Facebook’s TOS provides that “you
will not share your password . . . , let anyone else access your account,
or do anything else that might jeopardize the security of your
account.”119 That TOS further provides that “[i]f you violate the letter or
spirit of this Statement . . . , [Facebook] can stop providing all or part of
Facebook to you.”120 So, if an account holder were to provide his or her
username and password to a fiduciary, then the account holder would
violate Facebook’s TOS and trigger Facebook’s right to terminate the
agreement—at which point the account holder might lose access to any
digital property in the account. When service providers prohibit a fiduci-
ary from learning an account holder’s access information, they limit the
account holder’s ability to plan for the management of his or her digital
property.
Another challenge is that the TOS for some accounts state that they
terminate at an account holder’s death. For instance, Yahoo!’s TOS pro-
vides that “[y]ou agree that your Yahoo! account is non-transferable and
any rights to your Yahoo! ID or contents within your account terminate
upon your death. Upon receipt of a copy of a death certificate, your
account may be terminated and all contents therein permanently
deleted.”121 If an account and its contents will no longer exist after an
account holder’s death, how can the account holder properly plan to
have it managed for and distributed to his or her beneficiaries? The
seemingly clear answer: he or she cannot.
2. RESTRICTIONS ON THE FIDUCIARIES
When a fiduciary uses an account holder’s username and password
118. In a survey conducted by the authors, thirteen of twenty popular service providers either
prohibited account holders from disclosing their account access information or made account
holders responsible to keep their access information private or secure. Memorandum from Peter J.
Rademacher on Survey of Digital Serv. Provider Terms of Serv. to Christina L. Kunz (July 16,
2013) (on file with authors).
119. Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/legal/
terms (last revised Dec. 11, 2012).
120. Id.
121. Terms of Service, YAHOO!, http://info.yahoo.com/legal/us/yahoo/utos/utos-173.html (last
updated Mar. 16, 2012).
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to access and manage the account’s digital property, that fiduciary may
risk criminal liability under federal and state criminal statutes.
At the federal level, fiduciaries who exercise their powers over dig-
ital property without authorization risk potential criminal prosecution
under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984 (“CFAA”).122 The
CFAA provides criminal sanctions123 against anyone who “intentionally
accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access,
and thereby obtains . . . information from any protected computer.”124 A
“protected computer” includes all computers “used in or affecting inter-
state or foreign commerce or communication.”125 In Shurgard Storage
Centers, Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., the United States District
Court for the Western District of Washington determined that “since the
advent of the Internet, almost all computer use has become interstate in
nature[,]” by their ability to access the Internet.126 That makes sense,
given the fact that the Internet is certainly an interstate communication
forum. In United States v. Mitra, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit further clarified that any instrument used to access
the Internet falls within the definition of “computer” under the CFAA.127
Thus, an account holder’s home computer, laptop, notepad, and
smartphone may all qualify as protected “computers” under the CFAA,
because they can all be used to access the Internet.128 Furthermore, the
CFAA’s umbrella term may also cover computers and servers that sup-
port service providers.
While the CFAA does not define “authorization” or “authorized
access,” the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has
interpreted the term to mean any permission at all.129 Even under this
broad definition, it is unclear how a court would rule on the question of
whether a fiduciary, by his or her office, would have “authorization” to
access the computers that house the accounts offered by service provid-
122. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).
123. Id. § 1030(c).
124. Id. § 1030(a)(2)(c).
125. Id. § 1030(e)(2).
126. 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1127 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
127. 405 F.3d 492, 495–96 (7th Cir. 2005) (concluding that the CFAA applies to any devices
with capabilities comparable to a computer, including cell phones and iPods), aff’d, 134 F. App’x
963 (7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied sub nom. Mitra v. United States, 546 U.S. 979 (2005).
128. Greg Pollaro, iBrief, Disloyal Computer Use and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act:
Narrowing the Scope, DUKE L. & TECH. REV., at ¶ 8 (2010) (“The inclusion of all computers used
in interstate communication had a profound effect, intentionally or otherwise, as any computer
connected to the Internet could be considered a ‘protected computer’ under the CFAA.” (citation
omitted)).
129. See, e.g., LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1132–33 (9th Cir. 2009)
(applying the interpretive canons of plain meaning interpretation and rule of meaningful variation
to define “authorization” as any permission at all).
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ers, via the account of an account holder. If the account holder provided
no formal documentation to show authorization, then a court would
likely answer this question in the negative. But even if an account holder
were to give a fiduciary formal authorization, the fiduciary may still be
in danger of breaking the law. Because access to an account holder’s
account invariably requires accessing a service provider’s or a third-
party vendor’s computers, the fiduciary must obtain not only the account
holder’s authorization, but also the service provider’s authorization. As
discussed earlier, service providers may prohibit third-party access to
accounts.130 For example, Facebook’s TOS provides that “[y]ou will not
solicit login information or access an account belonging to someone
else.”131 So, although the account holder may authorize the fiduciary to
access the account, the fiduciary may be exceeding authorized access—
within the meaning of the CFAA—by logging into the Facebook
account if that access violates Facebook’s TOS.
This perspective is consistent with statements made by agents of
the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”). The DOJ has asserted
that the CFAA is broad enough to prosecute those who violate TOSs,132
as made clear by Richard Downing, Deputy Chief of the DOJ’s Com-
puter Crime and Intellectual Property Section, Criminal Division, in tes-
timony before the House Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and
National Security.133 However, Downing was careful to explain that the
“DOJ is in no way interested in bringing cases against people who lie
about their age on a dating site or anything of the sort. [The DOJ does
not] have time or resources to do that.”134 While these remarks and other
factors reasonably suggest that the DOJ is unlikely to prosecute individ-
uals for minor TOS violations, nevertheless, the potential for prosecu-
tion and the chilling effect on fiduciaries remain a reality.135
130. See supra notes 118–19 and accompanying text.
131. Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 119 (emphasis added).
132. Declan McCullagh, DOJ: Lying on Match.com Needs to Be a Crime, CNET (Nov. 14,
2011, 11:58 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31921_3-57324779-281/doj-lying-on-match.com-
needs-to-be-a-crime/ (quotation omitted); see also Lamm, supra note 20, at 12.
133. See Cyber Security: Protecting America’s New Frontier: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 5, 14
(2011) (statement of Richard W. Downing, Deputy Chief, Computer Crime and Intellectual
Property Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice) [hereinafter Hearing];
see also Lamm, supra note 20, at 12.
134. Hearing, supra note 133, at 69.
135. See Jim Lamm, Planning Ahead for Access to Contents of a Decedent’s Online Accounts,
DIGITAL PASSING (Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.digitalpassing.com/2012/02/09/planning-ahead-
access-contents-decedent-online-accounts/ (referencing state felony charges against defendant for
accessing his wife’s Gmail account); Kelsey T. Patterson, Note, Narrowing It down to One
Narrow View: Clarifying and Limiting the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 7 CHARLESTON L.
REV. 489, 519 & n.197 (2013) (citing United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 860, 862 (9th Cir.
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As if the CFAA were not enough to deter a fiduciary from execut-
ing his or her obligations, all fifty states criminalize unauthorized access
to computers, systems, or networks (some requiring additional acts in
conjunction with access itself).136 Each statute is codified differently,
but many share the following elements: (1) access to a computer, sys-
tem, or network; (2) with knowledge; and (3) without authorization or in
excess of authority.137 As with the CFAA, the real question under this
framework is what “authorization” means. Many state statutes fail to
define this term,138 and only some provide definitions for phrases like
“in excess of authority.”139 These definitions typically are consistent
with the CFAA.140 Thus, under a similar framework as that just dis-
cussed for the federal CFAA, a fiduciary also faces criminal prosecution
at the state level. This increases the likelihood of enforcement and the
potential penalty.
There is little indication how a court might rule regarding the
potential conflict between state probate law and state criminal law, so
this has a significant chilling effect—a fiduciary cannot execute his or
her obligations regarding digital property without risking state criminal
prosecution. On the other hand, a fiduciary has a duty under state law to
manage an account holder’s designated property, including digital prop-
erty. This crosscurrent of laws and duties leaves the fiduciary in an
untenable position.
2012) (“The government assures us that, whatever the scope of the CFAA, it won’t prosecute
minor violations. But we shouldn’t have to live at the mercy of our local prosecutor.”)).
136. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.740 (2013); IND. CODE § 35-43-2-3(b) (2013); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 266 § 120F (2013); MINN. STAT. § 609.891(1), (4) (2013); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 43-43B-1(1)–(2) (2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4102 (2013); see also Computer Hacking and
Unauthorized Access Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, www.ncsl.org/issues-research/
telecom/computer-hacking-and-unauthorized-access-laws.aspx (last updated June 19, 2012)
(listing the relevant statutes for all fifty states). For a more expansive list of and explanation of
state statutes criminalizing unauthorized access, see Memorandum from Peter J. Rademacher &
Lucie O’Neill to the Drafting Committee on Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets on Issues
Pertaining to Unauthorized Access Statutes (Aug. 8, 2012) (on file with authors and the Uniform
Law Commission).
137. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2316(A)(8) (2013).
138. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.740; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2316; MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 266 § 120F.
139. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-5.5-101(6.7) (2013).
140. Compare, e.g., id. (“‘Exceed authorized access’ means to access a computer with
authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information, data, computer program, or
computer software that the person is not entitled to so obtain or alter.”) with 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030(e)(6) (2012) (“[T]he term ‘exceeds authorized access’ means to access a computer with
authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the
accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter[.]”).
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3. RESTRICTIONS ON DIGITAL SERVICE PROVIDERS
Fiduciaries are not the only ones facing statutory conflicts. In 1986,
Congress passed the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(“ECPA”).141 Title 2 of that Act, known as the Stored Communications
Act (“SCA”),142 prohibits public providers of electronic communication
services (“ECS”)143 from “knowingly divulg[ing] to any person or entity
the contents of a communication which is carried or maintained on that
service . . . .”144 In addition, it prohibits public providers of remote com-
puting services (“RCS”)145 from “knowingly divulg[ing] to any person
or entity the contents of any communication which is carried or main-
tained on that service . . . .”146 Finally, the SCA prohibits public provid-
ers of either ECSs or RCSs from “knowingly divulg[ing] a record or
other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such ser-
vice . . . .”147 Often, service providers provide ECSs and RCSs simulta-
neously, with respect to different services.148 For instance, a message
sent and awaiting review by the recipient could be held by the service
provider as a provider of an ECS, while a photograph stored for private
or public viewing could be held by the service provider as a provider of
an RCS.149 A practical example of this occurred in Crispin v. Christian
Audigier, Inc., where the United States District Court for the Central
District of California held that Facebook acted as an ECS for purposes
of private messaging, while it acted alternatively as an ECS or RCS for
purposes of wall postings and comments.150 Thus, all restrictions under
141. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
1848 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1367, 2701–2711, 3117, 3121–3127 (2012)).
142. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711.
143. “‘[E]lectronic communication service’ means any service which provides to users thereof
the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications . . . .” Id. § 2510(15). An
“‘electronic communications system’ means any wire, radio, electromagnetic, photooptical or
photoelectronic facilities for the transmission of wire or electronic communications, and any
computer facility or related electronic equipment for the electronic storage of such
communications.” Id. § 2510(14).  Providers of electronic communication services hold files in
temporary electronic storage. See Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act,
and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1215 n.48 (2004). “For
example, ‘telephone companies and electronic mail companies’ generally act as providers of
electronic communication services.” Id. at 1214 n.38 (citing S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 14 (1986),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3568).
144. § 2702(a)(1).
145. Id. § 2711(2) (“[T]he term ‘remote computing service’ means the provision to the public
of computer storage or processing services by means of an electronic communications
system . . . .”). Providers of remote computing services hold files primarily as a storage or
processing service. See Kerr, supra note 143, at 1215 n.48.
146. § 2702(a)(2).
147. Id. § 2702(a)(3).
148. See Kerr, supra note 143, at 1215–16.
149. See id. at 1216 (providing a similar example).
150. See 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 980–82, 989–90 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
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the SCA may apply to any one service provider.
However, the SCA does not apply in all instances. It excludes pri-
vate providers of ECSs and RCSs, such as a private e-mail service
offered by an employer to employees or by a school to students.151 Fur-
thermore, it does not prohibit an RCS provider from disclosing commu-
nications if the provider is authorized to access the content.152 Finally, it
does not prohibit ECS or RCS providers from providing non-govern-
mental entities with non-content records pertaining to account holders,
such as the name of the person or entity attached to the account.153
Even when the SCA does apply, there are exceptions. Among these
is the right to disclose information “with the lawful consent of the origi-
nator or an addressee or intended recipient of such communication, or
the subscriber in the case of [RCSs].”154 Notably, this exception allows,
but does not require disclosure by a public provider of an ECS or
RCS.155
The primary issue with the SCA is much the same as that with the
CFAA. Just as the CFAA does not define “authorization,” the SCA does
not define “lawful consent.” In the context of the SCA, case law pro-
vides no clear answer regarding whether a fiduciary can provide “lawful
consent” to a service provider. In In re Facebook, Inc., the decedent’s
mother wished to investigate the cause of the decedent’s death.156 The
mother, who was also the executor, was granted leave to subpoena
records from the decedent’s Facebook account.157 Facebook moved to
quash the subpoena, which sought to compel Facebook to provide pri-
vate information from the decedent’s account.158 Facebook argued that it
was unclear whether an executor, standing in the shoes of the decedent,
could provide “lawful consent” for Facebook to divulge private informa-
tion.159 While the court suggested that the executor’s consent was suffi-
151. See § 2702(a)(1)–(2) (specifying that the prohibitions apply to a provider providing
service to the public, as opposed to providing the service to a private entity).
152. See id. § 2702(a)(2)(B).
153. See id. § 2702(a)(3).
154. Id. § 2702(b)(3) (emphasis added).
155. See id. § 2702(b).
156. 923 F. Supp. 2d 1204, 1205 (N.D. Cal. 2012); see also Jeff John Roberts, Dead Model’s
Parents Can’t Get Facebook Messages, Judge Says, GIGAOM (Sept. 27, 2012, 11:14 AM), http://
gigaom.com/2012/09/27/dead-models-parents-cant-get-facebook-messages-judge-says/.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. Facebook, Inc.’s Motion to Quash Subpoena in a Civil Case at 6–7, In re Facebook, Inc.,
923 F. Supp. 2d 1204 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (No. C 12-80171 LHK (PSG)), 2012 WL 8505651.
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cient,160 the court ultimately declined to rule on the issue.161 And even if
the court had determined that the executor could give lawful consent on
behalf of the decedent, the SCA does not require a service provider to
disclose private account records, but merely authorizes voluntary disclo-
sure.162 The court ultimately concluded that Facebook could not be com-
pelled to turn over the account contents in a civil action.163
The reality is that service providers have been reluctant to risk civil
liability for disclosing private information. This is especially true given
the growing number of account holders, the high cost of litigation, and
the lack of profit to be gained from those disclosures. While the court’s
dictum in In re Facebook, Inc. suggests that fiduciaries can provide con-
sent on behalf of account holders, it does not provide digital service
providers with certainty that they can rely on when facing the possibility
of civil liability. Thus, service providers have been understandably cau-
tious about disclosing information when the SCA applies.
To deter wrongful disclosure, the SCA does not operate alone. The
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) prevents commercial entities “from
using unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”164 To this end,
the FTC can prevent service providers and other commercial entities
from violating the PPs they use to draw consumers to their products and
services.165 The FTC’s Web site expressly provides: “When companies
tell consumers they will safeguard their personal information, the FTC
can and does take law enforcement action to make sure that companies
live up [to] these promises.”166
Living up to its mission, the FTC has brought dozens of charges
against various service providers, including Twitter,167 Facebook,168
160. In re Facebook, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 2d at 1206 (“Of course, nothing prevents Facebook
from concluding on its own that [the executor has] standing to consent on [the decedent’s] behalf
and providing the requested materials voluntarily.”).
161. See id. (“[C]ase law confirms that civil subpoenas may not compel production of records
from providers like Facebook.”).
162. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)–(c) (2012) (“A provider . . . may divulge the contents of a
communication [if an exception applies.]” (emphasis added)).
163. See In re Facebook, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 2d at 1206 (“Under the plain language of Section
2702, while consent may permit production by a provider, it may not require such a production.”
(emphasis in original) (citation omitted)).
164. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012).
165. Making Sure Companies Keep Their Privacy Promises to Consumers, FED. TRADE
COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/reporter/privacy/privacypromises.html (last modified Sept. 4,
2013).
166. Id.
167. See Twitter, Inc., 151 F.T.C. 162 (2011).
168. See Facebook, Inc., No. 092-3184, 2011 WL 6092532 (Nov. 29, 2011).
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MySpace,169 and Google.170 Thus, if a service provider chooses to vio-
late its PP by disclosing private information to a fiduciary, it opens itself
up to potential action by the FTC, as well as the public distrust that
comes with public actions.
In addition to the federal FTC, states have their own “Little FTC
Acts” that give states (and sometimes private parties) the power to bring
similar claims for deceptive practices.171 States are typically given
authority to seek “‘cease and desist order[s]’ or other injunctive
relief, . . . declaratory judgment[s], or . . . settlement agreement[s].”172
Under this federal and state framework, service providers face not
only greater chances of being penalized but also severe penalties.173
Thus, service providers remain reluctant to disclose private information
to fiduciaries unless their PPs expressly permit such disclosure.
Finally, if civil sanctions under the SCA and charges brought by
the federal and state FTCs were not enough to dissuade service provid-
ers from voluntarily disclosing private information, potential civil claims
by concurrent or successor fiduciaries (on behalf of the account holder
or beneficiaries) might be enough to dissuade service providers from
disclosure.174
IV. PURPORTED SOLUTIONS AND THEIR SHORTCOMINGS
Various private and public entities have proposed solutions to alle-
viate the problems that account holders, fiduciaries, and service provid-
ers face in the context of fiduciary management of digital property. This
section discusses those proposed solutions and illustrates potential
shortcomings.
A. Private Entities Promoting Private or Commercial
Planning Strategies
Private legal and commercial entities have provided account hold-
ers with options for digital estate planning, social media wills or trusts,
and digital legacy services, which attempt to move the estate planning
169. See Myspace LLC, No. 102-3058, 2012 WL 4101790 (Aug. 30, 2012).
170. See Google Inc., No. 102-3136, 2011 WL 5089551 (Oct. 13, 2011).
171. See Jack E. Karns, State Regulation of Deceptive Trade Practices Under “Little FTC
Acts”: Should Federal Standards Control?, 94 DICK. L. REV. 373, 375 & n.10 (1990).
172. CHRISTINA L. KUNZ & CAROL L. CHOMSKY, CONTRACTS: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH
561 (2d ed. 2013).
173. Karns, supra note 171, at 374 (“Little FTC Acts have attractive remedy provisions that
may permit treble damages.” (citation omitted)).
174. See UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 706(a), 1001 cmt. (2010); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-703(c)
(amended 2010); UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 116(a)(2) (2006); UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP AND
PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS ACT §§ 112(b), 416(a)(3) (1998).
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process into a digital medium. This section discusses how these options
may fail to resolve all of the conflicts that account holders and fiducia-
ries face.
When probate attorneys, legal academics, and entrepreneurs real-
ized the magnitude of digital property housed on computers and the
Internet, they attempted to develop processes that would alleviate indi-
viduals’ difficulties in estate planning for their digital assets. Referred to
as “digital estate planning,”175 this process involves step-by-step instruc-
tions for individuals or their attorneys to plan for the management of
digital property, through so-called “social media wills.”176
Under a typical digital estate planning method, an individual should
first—or at least early on—inventory his or her digital property, includ-
ing online accounts where property is housed, as well as other digital
property saved to the individual’s hardware.177 Second, the individual
should record all account numbers or usernames with their respective
passwords and preserve that account information digitally or in
hardcopy.178 Third, the individual should select a “digital fiduciary,”
who is not necessarily the same person who would perform other fiduci-
ary functions.179 A digital fiduciary often has technical qualifications
that make him or her more capable of satisfying the account holder’s
desires regarding digital property.180 Fourth, the individual should pro-
vide instructions regarding management of his or her digital property.181
These instructions help the digital fiduciary access accounts, communi-
cate with service providers, manage digital property, and coordinate
with other fiduciaries and interested persons. Finally, the individual
should give the digital fiduciary the proper authorization.182 This entire
process often takes the form of a “social media will” or trust—it can
also be extended to conservatorships and powers of attorney—which
purportedly isolates digital property from other more traditional prop-
175. See, e.g., Anderson, supra 19, at 44; Steven Maimes, Managing Your Digital Afterlife:
Cyber Footprint, Ownership, and Access, THE TRUST ADVISOR (Jan. 28, 2013), http://thetrustadvi
sor.com/headlines/digital-afterlife.
176. See, e.g., Gen. Servs. Admin., Write a Social Media Will, http://www.usa.gov/topics/
money/personal-finance/wills.shtml (last updated Sept. 6, 2013); Social Media Will, ROCKET
LAWYER, http://www.rocketlawyer.com/document/social-media-will.rl (last visited Oct. 19, 2013).
177. See Anderson, supra note 19, at 44 (listing inventorying of digital property as the second
step); Frank S. Baldino, Estate Planning and Administration for Digital Assets, MD. B.J.,
Nov.–Dec. 2012, at 28, 30.
178. See Baldino, supra note 177, at 30.
179. See Anderson, supra note 19, at 45 (listing selection of a digital fiduciary as the fourth
step).
180. See id.
181. See id. (listing the provision of instructions as the fifth step).
182. See id.
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erty.183 Interestingly, the General Services Administration has
encouraged this type of planning for digital property management.184
Despite its immediate appeal, digital estate planning raises one pri-
mary issue. It may cause account holders to violate TOSs that prohibit
them from disclosing their account access information to third parties,
that prohibit transfer of the account itself, or that prohibit third parties
from accessing their accounts. Any of these types of violations may trig-
ger remedial rights specified in the TOSs, sometimes including termina-
tion of service.185 Thus, digital estate planning nonetheless may be
impeded by the contract issues that TOSs raise during the planning and
execution processes.
Digital legacy services offer various combinations of these four cat-
egories of service:
• storing information such as account holders’ passwords like a
digital safe;186
• recording and facilitating how the individual’s digital estate plan
will be implemented;187
• performing specified tasks for the account holder, such as remov-
ing information from the list of accounts and passwords stored
with the service, so that fiduciaries are not made aware of
them;188 or
• streamlining the management process through partnerships with
service providers, and executing certain account-maintenance
actions.189
These services raise additional issues.
The first category of service does not work in the same manner as a
social media will or trust. Instead, account holders are merely provided
digital storage space for their account information. Still, if a digital leg-
acy service permitted sharing, and if an account holder gave a fiduciary
access to the digital legacy service account, the account holder may vio-
late a service provider’s TOS that prohibits sharing or disclosure of
183. See Gen. Servs. Admin., supra note 176.
184. See id.
185. E.g., Myspace Services Terms of Use Agreement, MYSPACE, https://myspace.com/pages/
terms (last revised June 10, 2013) (“Myspace expressly reserves the right to remove your Profile
or Content, in whole or in part, and/or deny, restrict, suspend, or terminate your access to all or
any part of the Myspace Services, if Myspace determines, in its sole discretion, that you have
violated this Agreement . . . .”).
186. KeePass Password Safe, KEEPASS, http://keepass.info/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2013).
187. LEGACY LOCKER, http://legacylocker.com/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2013).
188. CIRRUS LEGACY, http://www.cirruslegacy.com/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2013).
189. This is merely a hypothetical type of service that could be offered by digital legacy
services. To our knowledge, none do.
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access information.190 In addition, the account holder may violate the
digital legacy service’s TOS if that TOS prohibits violating third-party
service providers’ TOSs.191 Finally, if the fiduciary were able to access
the digital legacy service, the fiduciary might still be “exceeding author-
ized access” in violation of the TOS—risking criminal prosecution
under the CFAA and state criminal laws by using the information he or
she obtained on that digital legacy service to access the service
providers.192
The second and third categories of services are more consistent
with the concepts of social media wills or trusts. These services are
designed for account information and instructions to be transferred to
fiduciaries when triggered.193 These digital legacy services operate as a
beneficiary designation with the purpose of transferring an account
holder’s account information when triggered (typically at death). How-
ever, the benefit to the fiduciary sometimes comes with a proviso. Some
digital legacy services provide that their services cannot be used in a
manner that violates the TOS of a service provider.194 Because many
service providers prohibit disclosing account access information,195 it is
easy to violate this term by uploading or retrieving the account-access
information. In addition, even if an account holder selects a digital leg-
acy service that does not have a stated policy regarding violation of
other TOSs, the digital fiduciary still risks potential criminal prosecution
under the CFAA and state criminal laws.196
In theory, there remains a fourth category of service offered by dig-
ital legacy services. These digital legacy services could establish part-
nerships with service providers that allow the digital legacy services to
execute an account holder’s wishes without the need to worry about
authorization and TOS violations.197 In other words, this type of service
190. Facebook’s TOS provides: “You will not share your password . . . or do anything else that
might jeopardize the security of your account.” Statements of Rights and Responsibilities, supra
note 119 (emphasis added). Myspace’s TOS provides: “You agree not to . . . disclose your
password to any third party.” MYSPACE, supra note 185.
191. For example, SecureSafe’s TOS provides: “The customer is obligated to ensure that he
can provide data access to the Beneficiaries without violating third party rights or applicable
statutory provisions.” Standard Terms and Conditions of Business (T&C), SECURESAFE (Nov. 21,
2012), http://www.securesafe.com/en/terms.html (emphasis added).
192. See supra Part III.B.2.
193. The trigger is typically confirmation of death because these services are intended as a
medium for instructing posthumous wishes. See CIRRUS LEGACY, supra note 188 (“What happens
to my online life when I die?”); LEGACY LOCKER, supra note 187 (“Legacy Locker is a safe,
secure repository for your vital digital property that lets you grant access to online assets for
friends and loved ones in the event of loss, death, or disability.”).
194. See SECURESAFE, supra note 191.
195. See Statements of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 119.
196. See supra Part III.B.2.
197. At one time, such a digital legacy service did exist. See Your Digital Assets After Death,
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would not only operate as a social media will or trust; it could also
operate as a digital beneficiary designation for the account itself and the
account’s content (not just transferring account access information).
This category of service would present unique issues.198
Regardless of the unique legal issues that each type of service
raises, digital legacy services present practical issues for account hold-
ers. Digital legacy services are often developed as small start-up compa-
nies or concepts by systems architects, engineers, or programmers.199
Sometimes, these founders might not realize the potential demand of
their digital legacy services until they have grown beyond their original
conceptions. Other times, these founders may lose money in their digital
legacy services. Because of these unknowns, digital legacy services can
be sold, can go out of business, or can go into bankruptcy.200 If the sale
or shut down were to wipe out an account holder’s digital legacy ser-
vices account, he or she could lose data and even his or her entire digital
estate plan. Moreover, an account holder might not find out about the
digital legacy service’s demise before becoming incapacitated or dying.
In addition to their potential unreliability, digital legacy services—
particularly those offering the second, third, and fourth categories of ser-
vices—purport to facilitate complete and valid estate planning for digital
property, when in fact they may not,201 and these services may conflict
with the individual’s estate plan expressed in a will or revocable trust.
Thus, account holders could spend time and money to receive a service
that they may not, in fact, ultimately receive. In the extreme, this con-
ROCKETBOOM (Apr. 2, 2010), http://www.rocketboom.com/digital-assets/. However, it appears
that Entrustet, and subsequently SecureSafe, acquired this program; the services offered are now
unclear. See Welcome Entrustet Users!, SECURESAFE, http://www.securesafe.com/en/partners/
entrustet.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2013); Gerry W. Beyer & Naomi Cahn, Digital Planning: The
Future of Elder Law, 9 NAELA J. 135, 152 n.81 (2012).
198. Under such a scenario, three contracts would exist: (1) between the account holder and the
service provider, (2) between the account holder and the digital legacy service, and (3) between
the service provider and the digital legacy service. The first and third contracts would likely
conflict on the terms regarding the account holder’s disclosure of his or her access information
and the service provider’s disclosure of the account holder’s private information. There are canons
of contract construction that could resolve these issues. For example, later contracts prevail over
prior contracts and more specific terms prevail over more general terms. However, courts may not
always apply these canons properly, and the litigation costs to reach even a correct judicial
conclusion could be great.
199. See Rob Walker, Things to Do in Cyberspace when You’re Dead, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan.
9, 2011, at 30, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/09/magazine/09Immortality-t.html?
pagewanted=all&_r=0.
200. Baldino, supra note 177, at 30; Beyer & Cahn, supra note 197, at 152 (“[Digital legacy
services] come and go; their life is dependent upon the whims and attention spans of their creators
and creditors.” (citation omitted)); see also Walker, supra note 199; supra note 197.
201. See Beyer & Cahn, supra note 197, at 152 (“Some of these companies purport to
distribute digital assets to beneficiaries. . . . [T]hese companies cannot do this legally . . . .”).
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duct could even arise to the level of an unfair and deceptive trade
practice.
B. State Protection of Fiduciaries in Digital Property Management
Six states have enacted statutes explicitly granting personal repre-
sentatives (and, in one case, conservators) power to access some types of
digital property.202 At least seventeen other states have proposed similar
legislation.203 However, the inconsistencies among the existing state
statutes pose yet another problem for fiduciaries trying to manage digital
property. First, the statutes vary in the types of fiduciaries that are pro-
vided authority.204 Second, the statutes differ in scope. For instance,
some statutes compel service providers to provide fiduciaries access to
or copies of digital property,205 while others provide fiduciaries with
authorization to access digital property;206 still others provide the fiduci-
aries with complete power to manage digital property.207 Third, the stat-
utes differ on what types of accounts are covered. Connecticut and
Rhode Island limit their statutes to e-mail services,208 others include
social media and microblogging Web sites, and Indiana’s is broad
enough to include any information stored electronically by a custo-
dian.209 If six states cannot create consistency in this area of law, fifty
202. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-334a (2013); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-5-424(3)(z) (2011); IND.
CODE § 29-1-13-1.1 (2013); OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 269 (2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-27-2 (2011);
VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-110 (2012).
203. See, e.g., S. 279, Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2013), available at http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/
2013/Bills/Senate/PDF/S279v1.pdf; S. 54, 77th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2013), available
at https://olis.leg.state.or.us/liz/2013R1/Measures/Text/SB54/Introduced; S. 2313, 187th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2012), available at https://malegislature.gov/Bills/187/Senate/S02313; Leg.
783, 102d Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb. 2012), available at http://www.nebraskalegislature.gov/FloorDocs/
102/PDF/Intro/LB783.pdf; Assemb. 9317, 2011-12 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (NY 2012),
available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default_fld=&bn=A09317&term=2011&Text=Y;
H.R. 2580, Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2012), available at http://www.legis.state.pa.us/CFDOCS/Legis/PN/
Public/btCheck.cfm?txtType=PDF&sessYr=2011&sessInd=0&billBody=H&billTyp=B&billNbr=
2580&pn=3959; Jim Lamm, August 2013 List of State Laws and Proposals Regarding Fiduciary
Access to Digital Property During Incapacity or After Death, DIGITAL PASSING (Aug. 30, 2013),
http://www.digitalpassing.com/2013/08/30/august-2013-list-state-laws-proposals-fiduciary-
access-digital-property-incapacity-death/.
204. Compare IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-5-424 (providing conservators authority) with OKLA.
STAT. tit. 58, § 269 (providing personal representatives authority).
205. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-334a (“An [ECS] provider shall provide, to the executor or
administrator of the estate of a deceased person . . . access to or copies of the contents of the
[ECS] . . . .” (emphasis added)).
206. OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 269 (“The executor or administrator of an estate shall have the
power . . . to take control of, conduct, continue, or terminate any accounts of a deceased person on
any social networking website, any microblogging or short message service website or any e-mail
service websites.” (emphasis added)).
207. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-5-424(3)(z); see also Baldino, supra note 177, at 30.
208. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-334a; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-27-3 (2011).
209. IND. CODE § 29-1-13-1.1 (2013).
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states may exacerbate the convolution for laypersons and service
providers.
In addition to the confusion that the statutes create themselves,
fiduciaries must also consider which state statute applies for each service
provider, given the fact that many service providers include choice-of-
law clauses in their TOSs.210 For instance, it is possible that Oklahoma’s
statute may not apply to a service provider with a California choice-of-
law clause in its TOS, even if the account holder and fiduciary reside in
Oklahoma. Courts usually enforce choice-of-law clauses if they bear a
reasonable relation (not necessarily the most significant relation) to the
transaction.211 Although a court might void a choice-of-law clause—as a
matter of public policy—if the chosen state law ran too contrary to the
applicable fiduciary law of the court’s state,212 public policy is rarely
recognized as a defense. Thus, the digital property in a particular estate
might well be governed by many state statutes or the laws of another
country, as invoked by the various TOSs that govern various accounts of
the incapacitated or deceased person.
V. A HOLISTIC APPROACH TO RESOLUTION
The CFAA, the SCA, state criminal laws, privacy laws, and TOSs
all present obstacles to account holders attempting to plan for their digi-
tal estates, fiduciaries attempting to manage digital property, and service
providers attempting to remain out of the courts. Resolving a mul-
tifaceted problem requires a multifaceted approach. This section pro-
vides alternative solutions tailored to the individual problems faced by
account holders, fiduciaries, and service providers. Note that the pro-
posed solutions are legislative because the court system cannot resolve
the statutory issues discussed in this Article and will be hard-pressed to
keep up with the evolving technological issues. Thus, a clear and com-
prehensive solution at common law is unrealistic.
210. Google provides that “[t]he laws of California, U.S.A., excluding California’s conflict of
laws rules, will apply to any disputes arising out of or relating to these terms or the Services.”
Google Terms of Service, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/terms/ (last updated
Mar. 1, 2012). Activision Blizzard provides that the agreement between it and World of Warcraft
account holders “shall be governed by, and will be construed under, the laws of the United States
of America and the law of the State of Delaware, without regard to choice of law principles.”
World of Warcraft Terms of Use, supra note 21. These are two of many similarly drawn
provisions.
211. See, e.g., Cantu v. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 579 F.3d 434, 437–438 (5th Cir. 2009);
United Cntys. Trust Co. v. Mac Lum, Inc., 643 F.2d 1140, 1143 (5th Cir. 1981); Burroughs Corp.
v. Suntogs of Miami, Inc., 472 So. 2d 1166, 1167 (Fla. 1985); Aerospatiale Helicopter Corp. v.
Universal Health Servs., Inc., 778 S.W.2d 492, 499 (Tex. App. 1989).
212. Cf. Case Note, Fundamental Public Policy—Per Se Rule or Case-by-Case Determination:
Modern Computer Systems v. Modern Banking Systems, 23 CREIGHTON L. REV. 601, 618–20
(1990) (discussing court opinions upholding state franchise laws over choice-of-law provisions).
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The section concludes with a set of best practices that can reduce
the risks borne by account holders and fiduciaries in the interim.
Although these practices do not eliminate risk for account holders and
fiduciaries, they limit the risk, which is the only option account holders
and fiduciaries have, besides doing nothing with digital property at all.
A. Congressional Amendments
The first solution to the issue discussed in this article could come
from Congress, in the form of amendments to the SCA and CFAA.
These amendments would both resolve uncertainty regarding the appli-
cation of those statutes and provide persuasive arguments for preventing
the application of state criminal laws.
The SCA could be amended by augmenting § 2711 to define “law-
ful consent,” thereby eliminating any question about whether or not law-
ful consent is satisfied through state laws governing fiduciary fields. The
new SCA definition could read as follows:
(5) the term “lawful consent” means cognizable permission, either
tangible or digital, that has lawfully been executed by or on behalf of
any party whose consent is required, including, but not limited to, by
any fiduciary representing the party under state law, and remains in
force. Lawful consent can be given either expressly or implicitly pur-
suant to federal or state law or court order.
Likewise, the CFAA could be amended by augmenting § 1030(e)
to define “authorization,” eliminating any question about whether
authorization is satisfied by fiduciary appointments governed under state
law. This new definition would appear at § 1030(e)(6), and all other
definitions within § 1030(e) would shift to accommodate it. It could read
as follows:
(6) the term “authorization” means cognizable permission, either tan-
gible or digital, that has lawfully been executed by or on behalf of
any party whose authorization is required, including, but not limited
to, by any fiduciary representing the party under state law, and
remains in force. Authorization can be given either expressly or
implicitly pursuant to federal or state law or court order. Authoriza-
tion granted to one party shall extend to: (1) any fiduciary represent-
ing that party under state law, to the extent that the fiduciary’s
appointment includes that authorization; and (2) a third party granted
permission by either the original party or by any fiduciary represent-
ing the original party under state law. A fiduciary representing a party
under state law may only grant authorization to a third party within
the scope of that fiduciary’s authorization.
These amendments would also alleviate concerns that fiduciaries
face regarding state criminal laws. Although state statutes can provide
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their own definitions for “consent” or “authorization,” many of them
have not.213 If state courts were confronted with violations of unautho-
rized access statutes and had no definitions to interpret them, the defini-
tions in the SCA and CFAA could be used as persuasive tools to
interpret those statutes. Therefore, although the amendments only would
directly affect the SCA and CFAA, they may serve to provide greater
protections against state criminal statutes as well.
B. Uniform State Law
A uniform state law governing fiduciary management of digital
property could create a consistent state framework to resolve conflicts
with state criminal laws, as well as supplementing federal criminal and
civil laws. Today, the Uniform Law Commission is exploring this very
idea.214 As of the date of this article, a discussion draft of the Fiduciary
Access to Digital Assets Act (“FADA Act”) is published and under
review by the Uniform Law Commission.215 The FADA Act serves as a
freestanding act or amendment that extends the provisions of certain
other acts to the context of digital property. This article will address only
the most relevant of the FADA Act’s provisions—sections 3 through
10.216
Section 3 provides that all fiduciaries with authority over digital
property have “the same authority as the account holder[s]” and have
“the lawful consent of the account holder[s] and [are] . . . authorized
user[s] of the account[s].”217 Sections 4 through 7 then give agents, con-
servators, personal representatives, and trustees authority over digital
property in their respective capacities.218 However, each fiduciary is
treated differently regarding how they receive authority. Under section
4, for example, the default rule is that a personal representative has
authority over a decedent’s digital property,219 while, under sections 5
213. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.740 (2013); WIS. STAT. § 943.70 (2013); NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 28-1343, 28-1347 (2012).
214. Committees: Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, http://www
.uniformlaws.org/Committee.aspx?title=Fiduciary%20Access%20to%20Digital%20Assets (last
visited Sept. 4, 2013).
215. FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS ACT (Draft 2013), available at http://www
.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Fiduciary%20Access%20to%20Digital%20Assets/2013AM_FADA
_Draft.pdf.
216. For a more complete dissection of the FADA Act, see Samantha D. Haworth, Laying Your
Online Self to Rest: Evaluating the Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act, 68 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 535 (2014).
217. FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS ACT § 3 (Draft 2013), available at http://www
.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Fiduciary%20Access%20to%20Digital%20Assets/2013AM_FADA
_Draft.pdf.
218. Id. § 4 (personal representatives); id. § 5 (conservators); id. § 6 (agents); id. § 7 (trustees).
219. Id. § 4.
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and 6, a conservator or agent must be given specific authority over a
protected person’s or principal’s digital property.220 Finally, under sec-
tion 7, a trustee is given authority over digital property held in the trust
in accordance with the terms of the trust.221
After sections 3 through 7 provide fiduciaries with authority and
consent, section 8 provides the requirements for how each fiduciary may
request to access, take ownership of, or copy digital property.222 In addi-
tion, section 8 provides that “custodians” of digital property, or service
providers, must comply with proper requests for access to, ownership of,
or copying of digital property223 within a specified time period.224 And
because section 8 has the potential to put service providers at risk of
civil liability, the FADA Act also provides immunity for them.225
Finally, section 10 calls for courts to construe the FADA Act with
consideration for “the need to promote uniformity of the law with
respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.”226
The FADA Act, though still in the drafting stage of its develop-
ment, provides several key benefits. It is well-established in the common
law that the personal representative of a deceased person’s estate “stands
in the shoes of the decedent” in administering that estate, and other fidu-
ciaries have the authority to take actions necessary or incidental to
achieve a principal’s objectives, unless the principal directs otherwise.227
The FADA Act does not overturn these well-established fiduciary con-
cepts. Instead, it clarifies that modern digital assets and accounts are
within the scope of well-established fiduciary powers and authority. In
addition, the FADA Act is intended to bridge the gap between state fidu-
ciary laws and federal criminal and data privacy laws, particularly the
issues of “authorization” under the CFAA and “lawful consent” under
the SCA.228 To be sure, this raises questions of federalism and preemp-
tion. However, federal courts may look to state law to define terms for
which federal statutes lack definition.229 If a significant number of states
220. Id. § 5 (conservators); id. § 6 (agents).
221. Id. § 7.
222. Id. § 8(c).
223. Id. § 8(b).
224. Id. § 8(d).
225. Id. § 9.
226. Id. § 10.
227. 31 AM. JUR. 2D Executors and Administrators § 372 (2013); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF AGENCY § 2.02 (2006).
228. FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS ACT § 3 cmt. (Draft 2013), available at http://
www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Fiduciary%20Access%20to%20Digital%20Assets/2013AM_
FADA_Draft.pdf.
229. See, e.g., De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956) (“The scope of a federal right
is, of course, a federal question, but that does not mean that its content is not to be determined by
state, rather than federal law.”).
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enact the final FADA Act, then federal courts may be more inclined to
look to the FADA Act to define “authorization” under the CFAA230 and
“lawful consent” under the SCA.231
In addition, if the states uniformly adopted the FADA Act, the
issues surrounding TOSs’ choice-of-law clauses would be resolved. No
longer could service providers insulate themselves by selecting the laws
of states that do not compel disclosure of private information through
statute.
C. Best Practices in the Interim
While practitioners, scholars, and legislators work on permanent
solutions to the problems with fiduciary management of digital property,
account holders and fiduciaries still have to plan for and manage digital
property. To that end, they should take certain actions to increase their
level of certainty and reduce their level of risk. These practices will
reduce the likelihood that problems will arise before and during fiduci-
ary management of digital property.
1. HOW ACCOUNT HOLDERS SHOULD PLAN FOR
DEATH OR INCAPACITY
To increase certainty, account holders should take four steps to plan
ahead. First, they should inventory their digital footprint by listing all
accounts and whether the accounts or their contents have financial or
sentimental value.232 As part of this process, account holders should cre-
ate a list of usernames, account numbers, and passwords.233 Due to this
information’s sensitivity, account holders should take extra precautions
to ensure that it does not end up in the wrong hands—including either
encrypting an electronic list or securely storing a written list with
instruction that the only person permitted access is a fiduciary.234
Second, to the extent possible, account holders should regularly
back up any electronically stored information, especially when the infor-
mation is stored remotely by service providers subject to the SCA.235
This way, fiduciaries would only deal with service providers for the pur-
pose of closing or memorializing accounts, while accessing locally
stored data and backups for collecting, managing, and distributing digi-
tal property. If fiduciaries avoid the need to access information that is
230. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) (2012).
231. Id. § 2702(b)(3).
232. See LAMM, supra note 20, at 6.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 7–8, 10–11.
235. Id. at 10.
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stored remotely by service providers, then the fiduciaries also avoid the
potential problems of federal and state data privacy laws and computer
crime laws related to accessing remotely-stored information.
Third, account holders should make a plan for managing and dis-
tributing the digital property they have inventoried.236 This plan should
include designating a fiduciary under a power of attorney, trust, or will
with clear powers and authority over digital property.237 The plan should
also include instructions for distributing the content to beneficiaries,
abandoning or eliminating any digital property that is worthless, and
securely deleting any specified digital property the individual does not
want to pass on.238
Fourth, account holders should expressly authorize service provid-
ers to disclose their private information to their fiduciaries.239 This
authorization should clearly state the account holder’s intention to sat-
isfy the CFAA, SCA, state criminal laws, and privacy laws, to ensure
that the fiduciaries and service providers have evidence of the individ-
ual’s “lawful consent” and “authorized access.”240 The following is a
sample will provision:
Powers and authorizations regarding digital property. The per-
sonal representative may exercise all powers that an absolute owner
would have and any other powers appropriate to achieve the proper
investment, management, and distribution of: (1) any kind of comput-
ing device of mine; (2) any kind of data storage device or medium of
mine; (3) any electronically stored information of mine; (4) any user
account of mine; and (5) any domain name of mine. The personal
representative may obtain copies of any electronically stored infor-
mation of mine from any person or entity that possesses, custodies, or
controls that information. I hereby authorize any person or entity that
possesses, custodies, or controls any electronically stored information
of mine or that provides to me an electronic communication service
or remote computing service, whether public or private, to divulge to
the personal representative: (1) any electronically stored information
of mine; (2) the contents of any communication that is in electronic
storage by that service or that is carried or maintained on that service;
and (3) any record or other information pertaining to me with respect
to that service. This authorization is to be construed to be my lawful
consent under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986,
as amended; the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, as
amended; and any other applicable federal or state data privacy law
236. Id. at 11–12.
237. Id. at 11–13.
238. See id. at 11.
239. Id. at 9.
240. Id. at 11–12.
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or criminal law. The personal representative may employ any consul-
tants or agents to advise or assist the personal representative in
decrypting any encrypted electronically stored information of mine or
in bypassing, resetting, or recovering any password or other kind of
authentication or authorization, and I hereby authorize the personal
representative to take any of these actions to access: (1) any kind of
computing device of mine; (2) any kind of data storage device or
medium of mine; (3) any electronically stored information of mine;
and (4) any user account of mine. The terms used in this paragraph
are to be construed as broadly as possible, and the term “user
account” includes without limitation an established relationship
between a user and a computing device or between a user and a pro-
vider of Internet or other network access, electronic communication
services, or remote computing services, whether public or private.241
Note that this provision addresses disclosure, as well as authorized
access. Also note that the provision could be manipulated to authorize an
agent under a power of attorney or a trustee under a trust.
The following is a stand-alone authorization and consent document
that could be executed separately from a power of attorney, will, or trust
document:
Authorization and Consent for Release of Electronically Stored
Information
I hereby authorize any person or entity that possesses, custodies, or
controls any electronically stored information of mine or that pro-
vides to me an electronic communication service or remote comput-
ing service, whether public or private, to divulge to my then-acting
fiduciaries at any time: (1) any electronically stored information of
mine; (2) the contents of any communication that is in electronic stor-
age by that service or that is carried or maintained on that service;
and (3) any record or other information pertaining to me with respect
to that service. The terms used in this authorization are to be con-
strued as broadly as possible, and the term “fiduciaries” includes an
attorney-in-fact acting under a power of attorney document signed by
me, a guardian or conservator appointed for me, a trustee of my revo-
cable trust, and a personal representative (executor) of my estate.
This authorization is to be construed to be my lawful consent under
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, as amended; the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, as amended; and any other
applicable federal or state data privacy law or criminal law. This
authorization is effective immediately. Unless this authorization is
revoked by me in writing while I am competent, this authorization
241. See id. at 12–13.
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continues to be effective during any period that I am incapacitated
and continues to be effective after my death.
Unless a person or entity has received actual notice that this authori-
zation has been validly revoked by me, that person or entity receiving
this authorization may act in reliance on the presumption that it is
valid and unrevoked, and that person or entity is released and held
harmless by me, my heirs, legal representatives, successors, and
assigns from any loss suffered or liability incurred for acting accord-
ing to this authorization. A person or entity may accept a copy or
facsimile of this original authorization as though it were an original
document.242
This sample addresses all the fiduciary types that this article has
addressed. However, note that the sample provision only addresses con-
sent to disclose information, not authorization to access, which would be
handled separately in a power of attorney, will, or trust document or in a
court order appointing a conservator or a personal representative.
2. HOW FIDUCIARIES SHOULD MANAGE PROPERTY
WHEN NO PLAN EXISTS
To reduce risk, in the event the decedent or incapacitated failed to
plan ahead, fiduciaries should take five steps. First, any fiduciary desig-
nated to access, manage, or distribute an individual’s property, including
digital property, should consult an attorney to evaluate the risk. This
area of law is still developing and, to some extent, is unpredictable.
Fiduciaries are well advised to gather as much information as they can,
including the options they have at any given juncture in the process,
before further engaging in digital-property management.
Second, fiduciaries should contact the service providers to request a
copy of the contents of the decedent’s or incapacitated person’s valuable
or significant accounts.243 Requesting a copy of the contents avoids the
potential problems of attempting to directly access the account itself,
which could constitute “unauthorized access” within the scope of the
CFAA or state criminal laws.
Third, if there are any pending civil or criminal investigations
involving the decedent, fiduciaries should not access or tamper with any
digital property, so as to maintain complete and accurate copies of all
data.244 In the event that accessing digital property is necessary, fiducia-
ries should consult with an attorney and a computer forensics expert to
prevent altering or inadvertently deleting any digital property before or
242. See id. at 13.
243. See id. at 16.
244. Id. at 14–15.
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during pending investigations.245
Fourth, if no investigation is pending, fiduciaries should still create
exact image copies of all digital property before any other attempts to
access the storage device or data, to the extent possible.246 This will
ensure that information necessary for a computer forensics expert to
retrieve or recover the digital property, including Web-browsing history
and recently deleted files, are preserved.247 “Simply turning on and boot-
ing up a smartphone or computer can overwrite or wipe out data that
may be useful in a [computer] forensic examination.”248
Fifth, in the event that fiduciaries lack information regarding what
accounts a decedent or incapacitated person had, the content within
those accounts, and the necessary access information, fiduciaries should
consult with computer forensics experts to attempt to discover this
information.249
VI. CONCLUSION
Account holders, fiduciaries, and service providers face tremendous
obstacles regarding fiduciary management of digital property. Given the
growing ownership, value, and significance of digital property, the exi-
gency to resolve these problems is great. Despite this, legislatures,
courts, and service providers have failed to fully address these problems.
Furthermore, efforts at the private and public level so far have not pro-
vided clear and complete solutions to the risks that account holders,
fiduciaries, and service providers face.
The different types of fiduciaries discussed in this article each face
numerous problems raised by digital property. To resolve all of these
problems, legislatures must take a multifaceted approach. At the federal
level, the article provided simple amendments that would resolve the
obstacles raised by the CFAA and the SCA. At the state level, legisla-
tures can clarify the scope of fiduciary powers and authority in a uni-
form manner, influencing the impact of not only state laws, but also
federal laws. Until the federal and state legislatures take these or similar
steps, account holders, fiduciaries, and service providers can work to
minimize their respective uncertainty and risk by providing clear fiduci-
ary powers, authority, and instructions regarding digital property in
powers of attorney, wills, trusts, and stand-alone documents to support
existing or future fiduciary appointments.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 16.
247. Id. at 15.
248. Id.
249. See id.
